jueves, 31 de marzo de 2011
lunes, 28 de marzo de 2011
Mis notas en "cartas sobre la mesa" de Letras Libres
Noé Hernández Cortez
noe.hernandezcortez@gmail.com
noe.hernandezcortez@gmail.com
Debido a la generosidad de un amigo en 1987 tuve un encuentro feliz: cayeron en mis manos tres números de la memorable revista literaria Vuelta. Mi primera lectura en la revista Vuelta fue un escrito breve de José Luis Cuevas. Con Cuevas aprendí el temperamento irascible y violento de Diego Rivera. Otra lectura: el ensayo sobre la Una Megalomanía del poeta Gabriel Zaid. Con Zaid aprendí a no reverenciar a la autoridad académica y el ejercicio de la libertad en la cultura -creencia que sostengo en este blog-, después vino un proceso continuo de aprendizaje. En estas lecturas había un aire a la vez lejano y cercano que no lograba descifrar. Más tarde me di cuenta que esa inteligente y bella revista giraba en torno a un poeta cosmopolita: Octavio Paz, autor de un poema titulado Central Park.
Mi diálogo con la tradición literaria y liberal de Vuelta ha tenido continuidad con Letras Libres. Como todo diálogo el mío es privado y público. Producto de ese diálogo público han sido mis breves notas que han aparecido en la sección de cartas sobre la mesa de Letras Libres: Razón e imaginación (marzo, 2008); Acerca del ensayo “Política en Plural”, de John King (mayo, 2008) y Sobre Poder, intelectuales y opinadores de Roger Bartra (junio, 2010).
Ciudad de México a 28 de marzo de 2011.
En documento: Mis notas en cartas sobre la mesa de Letras Libres
Sobre el Índice Internacional sobre los Derechos de Propiedad: Reporte 2011
Noé Hernández Cortez
Se acaba de publicar el Reporte 2011 del Índice Internacional sobre los Derechos de Propiedad. El ranking lo encabezan los siguientes países:
Suecia (lugar No. 1) : 8.5
Finlandia (lugar No. 1): 8.5
Singapur (lugar No.3): 8.3
Suiza (lugar No. 4): 8.2
Noruega (lugar No. 4): 8.2
Nueva Zelanda (lugar No.4): 8.2
Luxemburgo(lugar No. 4): 8.2
Dinamarca (lugar No.8) : 8.1
Para América Latina la calificación es la siguiente:
Chile (lugar 28): 6.7
Puerto Rico (lugar 33): 6.5
Uruguay (lugar 44): 6.1
Costa Rica (lugar 50): 5.9
Panamá (lugar 55): 5.6
Brasil (lugar 64): 5.3
Colombia (lugar 75): 5.1
México (lugar 77): 5.0
Merece mención especial Venezuela que aparece en el lugar número 129 con un puntaje de 3.4, abajo de Zimbabwe que ocupa el lugar número 128 con 3.5. Venezuela, como sabemos, es el país en donde existe una fragilidad institucional en la protección de los derechos de propiedad, pues el Estado ha erosionado las bases institucionales de los derechos de propiedad con sus políticas económicas erráticas. Aquí el documento completo: International Property Rights Index
jueves, 24 de marzo de 2011
miércoles, 23 de marzo de 2011
"La intervención liberal", "la guerra justa" en Libia
El historiador de la “historia del presente”, Timothy Garton Ash escribe en The Guardian sobre las distorsiones de la llamada “intervención liberal“. En The New Republic Michael Walzer, el estudioso de la “guerra justa“, escribe contra la intervención en Libia. El argumento conductor de ambos es la reflexión moderna sobre la antigua noción de la guerra justa del mundo católico.
Kenneth Janda
La página del politólogo Kenneth Janda contiene recursos estadísticos, base de datos, recursos didácticos, recursos informáticos y buenos links de referencia sobre democracia y sistema de partidos.
domingo, 20 de marzo de 2011
Stephan Haggard y Robert R. Kaufman: La "organización" de la economía
Stephan M. Haggard
Noé Hernández Cortez
Stephan Haggard y Robert R. Kaufman en su obra Development, democracy, and Welfare States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe, analizan la "organización" de la economía como un componente que acompaña al desempeño económico de un Estado, el comportamiento de ambos componentes permiten evaluar la capacidad estatal para implementar políticas fiscales. Un buen desempeño económico estatal impacta en la política social, pues un crecimiento económico -con políticas fiscales efectivas- promueve la expansión de derechos sociales y el gasto social; por el contrario un bajo crecimiento económico se ve limitado a hacer efectivos los derechos sociales.
Para estudiar la organización de la economía en los países de ingreso medio de América Latina, Europa del Este y el Este Asiático, Haggard y Kaufman se apoyan en la literatura sobre el capitalismo. Algunas lecturas claves sobre el tema del capitalismo son las siguientes:
Andrew Shonfeld (1965), Modern Capitalism: The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power, London.
Peter J. Katzenstein (1978), Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial State, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Peter Hall y David Soskice (2001), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative advantage, (Reseña), New York: Oxford University Press.
Peter Gourevitch (1986), Politics in Hard Times: Comparative Responses To International Economic Crises, New York: Cornell University Press.
Peter A. Hall y Daniel W. Gingerich (2001), "Varities of Capitalism and Institutional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis", Harvard University, Paper prepared for presentation to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, August, 2001.
México a 20 de marzo de 2011
sábado, 19 de marzo de 2011
miércoles, 16 de marzo de 2011
Hacia una economía política de la política social
Noé Hernández Cortez
noe.hernandezcortez@gmail.com
noe.hernandezcortez@gmail.com
Un proyecto de investigación impulsado por Stephan Haggard y Robert R. Kaufman es el de una economía política de la política social que analice el estado de bienestar de los países de América Latina, el Este Asiático y los países de Europa del Este. Como todo proyecto de investigación, el de Haggard y Kaufman parte de una tradición intelectual entre la economía política, la ciencia política y las teorías del estado de bienestar. Sobre esta tradición inicio a escribir los estudios académicos que la conforman. Aquí sólo una breve nota bibliográfica.
Baum, Matthew A. y David A. Like (2003), “The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital”, en American Journal of Political Science, Vol.47, No.2, Abril, pp. 333-347.
Dornbush, Rudiger y Sebastian Edwards, editores, (1991), The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America, The National Bureau of Economic Research (en línea)
Haggard, Stephan y Robert R. Kaufman (2008), Development, democracy, and welfare states: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe, United Kingdom: Princeton University Press.
Hirschman, Albert O. (1987) “The Political Economy of Latin America Development: Seven Exercises in Retrospection”, en Latin American Research Review, Vol. 22, No.3, pp. 7-36.
Hirschman, Albert O (1987) “The Political Economy of Import-Substituting Industrialization in Latin America”, en The Quarterly Journals of Economics, Vol. 82, No.1
México a 16 de marzo de 2011
En documento: Hacia una economía política de la política social
Cyril Morong: economía y ficción.
En su blog Dollars and Dragons, Cyril Morong ha escrito una interesante nota sobre la relación entre economía y ficción. Nos recuerda Morong que para Paul Krugman la teoría económica está habitada por parábolas, Steven Landsburg nos dice que los modelos económicos son parábolas -la ley de oferta y demanda es en última instancia una ficción- Lo extraño -escribe Morong- es que en la biblioteca de Adam Smith no había ningún libro de ficción. La nota completa de Cyril Morong aquí.
lunes, 14 de marzo de 2011
Martha Nussbaum: la educación humanista en democracia
Noé Hernández Cortez
Martha Nussbaum , la filósofa política de la Universidad de Chicago, ha concedido una entrevista a la revista Literal. Latin American Voices. La entrevista la conduce Edgar Morales y el tema es la pertinencia de la educación liberal y universalista en los modelos educativos. Nussbaum nos recuerda en esta entrevista la necesidad de una educación humanista, inspirada en el ejercicio socrático del autoconocimiento, que nos prepare para el ejercicio de la razón crítica. Un componente de los regímenes democráticos es precisamente un modelo educativo que permita el libre ejercicio de la crítica, inspirado en las artes y las humanidades.
Nussbaum realiza una crítica a los modelos educativos inspirados en las posturas multiculturalistas. Su filosofía política no se sustenta en la parcialidad de los valores humanos, sino que aspira a la universilidad de los mismos, pues una democracia se debe sustentar en la creencia y defensa de los derechos humanos como un valor humano que restituya la dignidad humana. Otro rasgo distintivo de la obra de Martha Nussbaum es su trabajo junto a Amartya Sen, con quien ha colaborado para el sustento filosófico -inspirado en la ética de Aristóteles- de modelos de desarrollo en la economía de bienestar. Un trabajo muy sugerente de Nussbaum, como lo enuncia la nota introductoria de la revista Literal, son sus estudios sobre la relación entre la imaginación literaria y el sistema judicial, esto último es una lección importante para los departamentos de Ciencia Política en México, quienes han marginado a la literatura de la formación intelectual de sus estudiantes.
México, a 14 de marzo de 2011.
En documento: Martha Nussbaum. La educación humanista en democracia
viernes, 11 de marzo de 2011
Presentación del libro: Entre la Soberbia y la Incertidumbre de Sadio Garavini di Turno.
El ex diplomático y escritor venezolano Sadio Garavini di Turno presenta este 24 de marzo en la Librería El Buscón, en Caracas, Venezuela, su más reciente libro Entre la Soberbia y la Incertidumbre bellamente editado por Random House Mondadori. La portada del libro evoca el temperamento clásico del escritor liberal que es Sadio. Un libro indispensable, que animará sin lugar a dudas, la plaza pública de los demócratas en Venezuela. Enhorabuena Sadio.
Ciudad de México a 11 de marzo de 2011
martes, 8 de marzo de 2011
Diego Reynoso: La carencia del ejercicio de la crítica
Noé Hernández Cortez
Diego Reynoso es un académico argentino estudioso de la política. He leído con agrado parte de su obra académica, destaco aquí su libro Votos ponderados. Sistemas electorales y sobrerrepresentación distrital, publicado por Flacso México, Porrúa y la Cámara de Diputados.
Leyendo su blog Votos ponderados –sí, Diego tiene un gusto por la jerga de la ciencia política americana- me encuentro una nota sobre Mario Vargas Llosa. La nota me atrapa porque me interesa saber que dice Diego sobre Vargas Llosa. Escribe Diego: “No soy amigo de hacer juicios normativos o emitir juicios de valor sobre el comportamiento político […]”. Diego quiere mirar desde lo alto de lo que él considera la cumbre del conocimiento: la ciencia política, y para pertenecer a esta estirpe hay que estar exentos de emitir juicios de valor. No le creo a Diego, luego de leer estas líneas escritas con pasión política: “Me imagino un MVLL despotricando contra el gobierno de CFK, provocando hasta el límite insultante…”.
No está mal la pasión política de Diego, pues para un público más amplio como corresponde escribir para un blog, una prosa de esta naturaleza gana lectores. Sólo lamento que sea una prosa tan desaliñada la de esta nota sobre Vargas Llosa; además de la jerga académica que impregna su escritura, por ejemplo esa manía de escribir telegráficamente “MVLL” o “CFK”. En fin, la nota de Diego Reynoso sobre Vargas Llosa manifiesta una carencia del ejercicio de la crítica a la altura de la prosa del Nobel de Literatura que tanta aversión le causa.
México, a 08 de marzo de 2011.
En documento: Diego Reynoso. La carencia del ejercicio de la crítica
Bahrain and the Battle Between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
By George Friedman
Read more: Bahrain and the Battle Between Iran and Saudi Arabia | STRATFOR
The world’s attention is focused on Libya, which is now in a state of civil war with the winner far from clear. While crucial for the Libyan people and of some significance to the world’s oil markets, in our view, Libya is not the most important event in the Arab world at the moment. The demonstrations in Bahrain are, in my view, far more significant in their implications for the region and potentially for the world. To understand this, we must place it in a strategic context.
As STRATFOR has been saying for quite a while, a decisive moment is approaching, with the United States currently slated to withdraw the last of its forces from Iraq by the end of the year. Indeed, we are already at a point where the composition of the 50,000 troops remaining in Iraq has shifted from combat troops to training and support personnel. As it stands now, even these will all be gone by Dec. 31, 2011, provided the United States does not negotiate an extended stay. Iraq still does not have a stable government. It also does not have a military and security apparatus able to enforce the will of the government (which is hardly of one mind on anything) on the country, much less defend the country from outside forces.
Filling the Vacuum in Iraq
The decision to withdraw creates a vacuum in Iraq, and the question of the wisdom of the original invasion is at this point moot. The Iranians previously have made clear that they intend to fill this vacuum with their own influence; doing so makes perfect sense from their point of view. Iran and Iraq fought a long and brutal war in the 1980s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran is now secure on all fronts save the western. Tehran’s primary national security imperative now is to prevent a strong government from emerging in Baghdad, and more important, a significant military force from emerging there. Iran never wants to fight another war with Iraq, making keeping Iraq permanently weak and fragmented in Tehran’s interest. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq sets the stage for Iran to pursue this goal, profoundly changing the regional dynamic.
Iran has another, more challenging strategic interest, one it has had since Biblical times. That goal is to be the dominant power in the Persian Gulf.
For Tehran, this is both reasonable and attainable. Iran has the largest and most ideologically committed military of any state in the Persian Gulf region. Despite the apparent technological sophistication of the Gulf states’ militaries, they are shells. Iran’s is not. In addition to being the leading military force in the Persian Gulf, Iran has 75 million people, giving it a larger population than all other Persian Gulf states combined.
Outside powers have prevented Iran from dominating the region since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, first the United Kingdom and then the United States, which consistently have supported the countries of the Arabian Peninsula. It was in the outsiders’ interests to maintain a divided region, and therefore in their interests to block the most powerful country in the region from dominating even when the outsiders were allied with Iran.
With the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, this strategy is being abandoned in the sense that the force needed to contain Iran is being withdrawn. The forces left in Kuwait and U.S air power might be able to limit a conventional Iranian attack. Still, the U.S. withdrawal leaves the Iranians with the most powerful military force in the region regardless of whether they acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, in my view, the nuclear issue largely has been an Iranian diversion from the more fundamental issue, namely, the regional balance after the departure of the United States. By focusing on the nuclear issue, these other issues appeared subsidiary and have been largely ignored.
The U.S. withdrawal does not mean that the United States is powerless against Iran. It has been reconstituting a pre-positioned heavy brigade combat team set in Kuwait and has substantial air and naval assets in the region. It also can bring more forces back to the region if Iran is aggressive. But it takes at least several months for the United States to bring multidivisional forces into a theater and requires the kind of political will that will be severely lacking in the United States in the years ahead. It is not clear that the forces available on the ground could stop a determined Iranian thrust. In any case, Iraq will be free of American troops, allowing Iran to operate much more freely there.
And Iran does not need to change the balance of power in the region through the overt exercise of military force. Its covert capability, unchecked by American force, is significant. It can covertly support pro-Iranian forces in the region, destabilizing existing regimes. With the psychology of the Arab masses changing, as they are no longer afraid to challenge their rulers, Iran will enjoy an enhanced capacity to cause instability.
As important, the U.S. withdrawal will cause a profound shift in psychological perceptions of power in the region. Recognition of Iran’s relative power based on ground realities will force a very different political perception of Iran, and a desire to accommodate Tehran. The Iranians, who understand the weakness of their military’s logistics and air power, are pursuing a strategy of indirect approach. They are laying the foundation for power based on a perception of greater Iranian power and declining American and Saudi power.
Bahrain, the Test Case
Bahrain is the perfect example and test case. An island off the coast of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are linked by a causeway. For most purposes, Bahrain is part of Saudi Arabia. Unlike Saudi Arabia, it is not a major oil producer, but it is a banking center. It is also the home of the U.S. 5th Fleet, and has close ties to the United States. The majority of its population is Shia, but its government is Sunni and heavily linked to Saudi Arabia. The Shiite population has not fared as well economically as Shia in other countries in the region, and tensions between the government and the public have long existed.
The toppling of the government of Bahrain by a Shiite movement would potentially embolden Shia in Saudi Arabia, who live primarily in the oil-rich northeast near Bahrain. It also would weaken the U.S. military posture in the region. And it would demonstrate Iranian power.
If the Saudis intervened in Bahrain, the Iranians would have grounds to justify their own intervention, covert or overt. Iran might also use any violent Bahraini government suppression of demonstrators to justify more open intervention. In the meantime, the United States, which has about 1,500 military personnel plus embassy staff on the ground in Bahrain, would face the choice of reinforcing or pulling its troops out.
Certainly, there are internal processes under way in Bahrain that have nothing to do with Iran or foreign issues. But just as the internal dynamic of revolutions affects the international scene, the international scene affects the internal dynamic; observing just one of the two is not sufficient to understand what is going on.
The Iranians clearly have an interest in overthrowing the Bahraini regime. While the degree to which the Iranians are involved in the Bahraini unrest is unclear, they clearly have a great deal of influence over a cleric, Hassan Mushaima, who recently returned to Bahrain from London to participate in the protests. That said, the Bahraini government itself could be using the unrest to achieve its own political goals, much as the Egyptian military used the Egyptian uprising. Like all revolutions, events in Bahrain are enormously complex — and in Bahrain’s case, the stakes are extremely high.
Unlike Libya, where the effects are primarily internal, the events in Bahrain clearly involve Saudi, Iranian and U.S. interests. Bahrain is also the point where the Iranians have their best chance, since it is both the most heavily Shiite nation and one where the Shiites have the most grievances. But the Iranians have other targets, which might be defined as any area adjoining Saudi Arabia with a substantial Shiite population and with American bases. This would include Oman, which the United States uses as a support facility; Qatar, headquarters of U.S. Central Command and home to Al Udeid Air Base; and Kuwait, the key logistical hub for Iraqi operations and with major army support, storage and port facilities. All three have experienced or are experiencing demonstrations. Logically, these are Iran’s first targets.
The largest target of all is, of course, Saudi Arabia. That is the heart of the Arabian Peninsula, and its destabilization would change the regional balance of power and the way the world works. Iran has never made a secret of its animosity toward Saudi Arabia, nor vice versa. Saudi Arabia could now be in a vise. There is massive instability in Yemen with potential to spill over into Saudi Arabia’s southern Ismaili-concentrated areas. The situation in Iraq is moving in the Iranians’ favor. Successful regime changes in even one or two of the countries on the littoral of the Persian Gulf could generate massive internal fears regardless of what the Saudi Shia did and could lead to dissension in the royal family. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Saudis are moving aggressively against any sign of unrest among the Shia, arresting dozens who have indicated dissent. The Saudis clearly are uneasy in the extreme.
Iran’s Powerful Position
The Iranians would be delighted to cause regime change throughout the region, but that is not likely to occur, at least not everywhere in the region. They would be equally happy simply to cause massive instability in the region, however. With the United States withdrawing from Iraq, the Saudis represent the major supporter of Iraq’s Sunnis. With the Saudis diverted, this would ease the way for Iranian influence in Iraq. At that point, there would be three options: Turkey intervening broadly, something it is not eager to do; the United States reversing course and surging troops into the region to support tottering regimes, something for which there is no political appetite in the United States; and the United States accepting the changed regional balance of power.
Two processes are under way. The first is that Iran will be the single outside power with the most influence in Iraq, not unlimited and not unchallenged, but certainly the greatest. The second is that as the United States withdraws, Iran will be in a position to pursue its interests more decisively. Those interests divide into three parts:
- eliminating foreign powers from the region to maximize Iranian power,
- convincing Saudi Arabia and other countries in the region that they must reach an accommodation with Iran or face potentially dangerous consequences, and
- a redefinition of the economics of oil in the Persian Gulf in favor of Iran, including Iranian participation in oil projects in other Persian Gulf countries and regional investment in Iranian energy development.
The events in the Persian Gulf are quite different from the events in North Africa, with much broader implications. Bahrain is the focal point of a struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for control of the western littoral of the Persian Gulf. If Iran is unable to capitalize on events in Bahrain, the place most favorable to it, the moment will pass. If Bahrain’s government falls, the door is opened to further actions. Whether Iran caused the rising in the first place is unclear and unimportant; it is certainly involved now, as are the Saudis.
The Iranians are in a powerful position whatever happens given the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. Combine this with a series of regime changes, or simply destabilization on the border of Saudi Arabia, and two things happen. First, the Saudi regime would be in trouble and would have to negotiate some agreement with the Iranians — and not an agreement the Saudis would like. Second, the U.S. basing position in the Persian Gulf would massively destabilize, making U.S. intervention in the region even more difficult.
The problem created by the U.S. leaving Iraq without having been able to install a strong, pro-American government remains the core issue. The instability in the Persian Gulf allows the Iranians a low-risk, high-reward parallel strategy that, if it works, could unhinge the balance of power in the entire region. The threat of an uprising in Iran appears minimal, with the Iranian government having no real difficulty crushing resistance. The resistance on the western shore of the Persian Gulf may be crushed or dissolved as well, in which case Iran would still retain its advantageous position in Iraq. But if the perfect storm presents itself, with Iran increasing its influence in Iraq and massive destabilization on the Arabian Peninsula, then the United States will face some extraordinarily difficult and dangerous choices, beginning with the question of how to resist Iran while keeping the price of oil manageable.
“Bahrain and the Battle Between Iran and Saudi Arabia is republished with permission of STRATFOR.”
miércoles, 2 de marzo de 2011
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